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THE SUBMARINE
AND
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921
Lawrence H. Douglas
Following the First World War, the
tide of public opinion was overwhelmingly against the submarine as a weapon
of war. The excesses of the German
U-boat had stunned the sensibilities of
the world but had, nonetheless, presented new ideas and possibilities of this
weapon to the various naval powers of
the time. The momentum of these new
ideas proved so strong that by the
opening of the first major international
disarmament conference of the 20th
century, practical uses of the submarine
had all but smothered the moral indignation of 1918.
Several months prior to the opening
of the conference, the General Board of
the American Navy was given the task
of developing guidelines and recommendations to be used by the State Department in determining the American
proposals to be presented. The orien-

tation of this group, simply stated, was
that second best in naval strength meant
last. A policy of naval superiority was
necessary, they felt, for "history consistently shows that war between no two
peoples or nations can be unthinkable.,,1 A second group, the Naval
Advisory Committee (Admirals Pratt
and Coontz and Assistant Secretary of
the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, Jr.) also
submitted recommendations concerning
the limitation of naval armaments.
From the outset their deliberations were
guided by a concern that had become
more and more apparent-the threat
posed to the security and interests of
this country by Japan. This concern was
evidenced in an attempt to gain basic
understandings with Britain.
The submarine received its share of
attention in the deliberations of these
two groups. One approach to the
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weapon, considered in a draft proposal
submitted by Capt. F.H. Schofield,
called for the total and permanent
abolition of submarines and the destruction of all submarines, built and building. 2 In support of his proposal, Schofield noted that the relative strengths of
the world's navies would not be materially affected by such a move, and
increasing the numbers of submarines
would involve large expenditures for
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) vessels.
However, save this one proposal, the
elimination of any armament by type
received scant attention in these early
recommendations as it was thought to
hold little promise of success. 3
A second approach to the problem
was to scrap submarines then in existence and place restrictions upon new
construction, thereby establishing maximum tonnage allowances in vessel types
permitted each power. The Advisory
Committee drew up three plans involving this basic principle and submitted them to the General Board and
the Secretary of the Navy on 20 October 1921. Under plan I the submarine
tonnage recommended for this country
and England was a maximum of 90,000
tons, while Japan, France, and Italy
were each allotted' 54,000 tons. 4 Those
submarines building at the time of the
Conference could be completed up to
the assigned tonnage, but no new construction would be permitted except to
replace those units reaching 12 years of
service. Plans II and III were quite
similar to plan I but for the maximum
allowed tonnage (85,000 tons for England and the United States and 51,000
tons for the other powers). The Navy
Department was of the opinion that
plan I "is the best plan and is the one
which ... it advises be adopted."s
A memorandum prepared for the
General Board by Capt. H.H. Bemis of
the Submarine Section of the Office of
Naval Operations expressed the opinion
of those professionals who favored retention of the submarine. After citing

the improyed capabilities and the primary uses of the submarine, Bemis
opposed its abolition " ... chiefly on
account of the impossibility of doing
SO.,,6
"History," continued Bemis,
"shows only· too well the value of a
'scrap of paper' when the life of a
nation is at stake." Alluding to England,
he also noted that, "Two weapons are
now in hand that challenge her supremacy, one of which is the submarine,
and, naturally, she would be glad to see
that 'outlawed. ,,, In concluding this
section of his memorandum, Captain
Bemis observed that relative to the
Pacific, "the United States will make a
criminal mistake if she becomes a party
to an agreement to abolish submarines. ,,7
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
Roosevelt expressed his agreement with
Bemis in a paper entitled "Limitation of
Armaments." "In an assumed war
against the world," he wrote, "the
submarine would be of most value
... against the two island empiresGreat Britain and Japan." It was imperative that we "not permit our hands to
be tied as regards submarines."s
In this same paper Roosevelt observed that Japan was our most probable enemy at present, and if the Conference did not provide us with a
dominating naval strength in the Pacific,
we should conclude a "treaty such that
Japan cannot break it as regards us
without breaking it with others." In
other words, an "entangling alliance."
With an eye on the development of new
weapons, Roosevelt wrote that the
United States should be the " ... last
nation to advocate any limitation upon
the extension of recent weapons or the
development of new ones.,,9 The President, Secretary of the Navy Hughes, and
Roosevelt agreed that disarmament was
an impossible objective and that the
reduction or limitation of armaments
was all that could be hoped for.
The independently formulated General Board plans were, however, un-
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acceptable to Hughes and Roosevelt for
they were, as Roosevelt noted years
later, "what one would have expected
from the Naval Board-an estimate of
limitations (based) on' 'naval needs,'
which represented not a limitation of
armaments for the United States but an
increase.',10 Such a plan was folly, and
Roosevelt decided to consult Admiral
Pratt whom he thought to be "the
ablest naval statesman," and together
they hit upon and developed the idea of
using existing naval strength as the basis
for the American proposals.
The plan laid before the Conference
by Hughes at the first plenary session
detailed a reduction and limitation of
naval armaments for Great Britain, the
United States, and Japan in a ratio of
5:5:3, respectively, but left the ratio for
Italy and France for the Conference to
determine. 11 Tonnage limitations consistent with the 5:5:3 ratio were assigned for each type of vessel with the
submarine tonnage allotment being the
same as that allowed in plan I of the
Advisory Committee (Le., 90,000 tons
for Great Britain and the United States
and 54,000 tons for Japan). 12
At the second plenary session (15
November) the representatives of the
various countries presented their replies
to the American proposals. Arthur J.
Balfour, representing the British Empire, noted the willingness of his country to accept the naval ratio suggested
by Hughes but made such acceptance
conditional upon the continued supremacy of England in European
waters. The British also wished to retain
complete freedom in the building of
cruisers and other auxiliary types and
limit only their battle fleet or capital
ships.13 This disagreement regarding
cruisers was to plague Anglo-American
relations for years following the Washington Conference and emphasized the
differences between the roles and needs
of these two naval powers. Great
Britain, with a large global empire,
needed both a battle fleet and a large

number of commerce escort vessels,
while the primary concern of the American Navy was defense of the continental
United States.
Proceeding to the limitations proposed for submarines, Balfour reported
that his country's experts thought the
amount of submarine tonnage permitted
was too large. He thought that the
tonnage should be reduced further and
suggested that the Conference might
possibly "forbid altogether the construction of those ... submarines of
great size ... whose sole purpose is attack ... by methods which civilized nations regard with horror."14 Only
fleeting reference was made to the
abolition of the submarine and then
only to note that such a decision
"would be impossible, or, if possible, it
might well be thought undesirable to
abolish it altogether. ,,15
Delegations from the other countries
at this second public meeting of the
Conference voiced general satisfaction
with the American proposals, but their
remarks, and particularly those of
France and Japan, indicated that each
nation expected special consideration
because of its particular situation (e.g.,
geography, current naval strength, national interests, et cetera).
Two memorandums prepared for the
American representatives contained
what eventually became the basic position of the United States regarding the
question of submarine limitation used
for the remainder of the Conference. A
General Board memorandum (No. 43B,
ser. 1088-dd) transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy on 15 November
assumed that while unrestricted submarine warfare was indeed to be abolished,
the submarine itself was an "effective
and legitimate weapon of warfare." The
depredations visited upon the world by
the submarine in the last war were to be
prevented from recurring not by outlawing the weapon but by clearly defining the rules under which the submarine was to operate in time of war.
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The second memorandum, prepared
by Capt. Sinclair Cannon of Colonel
Roosevelt's staff, responded to several
questions regarding the submarine that
had been raised during the first meeting
of the Subcommittee of Technical Experts (16 November) and was explicit as
to why this country should retain a
strong submarine force. The British had
proposed that the tonnage be reduced
from 90,000 tons to 45,000 tons for
both themselves and the United States
and that Japan be allotted 27,000 tons
as opposed to the 54,000 tons originally
proposed by the United States. In his
memorandum to the Director of War
Plans, Captain Cannon advised that such
a substitution should not be allowed.
One reason he discussed was the defense
of the American island possessions in
the Pacific where he considered the
submarine an absolute necessity.16 In
the event of hostilities in the Pacific,
observed Cannon, "the presence of submarines with our fleet would be of vital
iIpportance . ~ ... 17 The submarine as-a
determining f§lC!or in future operations
of the British Navy also received Cannon's attention. With submarines reduced to a minimum, observed the
captain, the British Fleet would be more
at liberty to carry on offensive operations in the event of war, whereas, "if
submarines are allowed, that fact in
itself might prevent Great Britain from
going to war ...... 18
Although agreed upon in theory, the
specific provisions of the proposed limitation ratio among the three major
powers proved to be a source of continuing difficulty. With certain reservations, Great Britain accepted the ratio
of 5:5:3 (10:10:6) as originally set
forth by Hughes, but Japan proved to
be considerably more recalcitrant in
arriving at an understanding. Demanding
security in her own waters and dissatisfied with the assurances that a
four-power consultative pact might provide (as a substitute for the now defunct
Anglo-Japanese alliance), Japan insisted

that a 10:10:7 ratio be instituted. The
General Board saw such a ratio as
placing Japan in a position to "carry
forward her aggressive policies in the
Far East, thereby endangering the peace
of the world." 19
The ratio deadlock was broken by
permitting Japan to keep a new construction battleship (Mutsu) originally
slated for destruction and an agreement
by England and the United States to
nonfortification of their Pacific possessions.
Extending the ratio to France and
Italy in the balanced proportion (1.67)
also proved difficult. France demanded
that she be allowed a ratio of 3.5, and
Italy insisted on parity with France.
After considerable debate and a personal appeal to Premier Briand by Secretary Hughes, France accepted the 1.67
ratio but made formal reservation to the
extension of the limitation ratio to
surface auxiliaries and to submarines
which France considered to be of a
purely defensive nature and necessary to
insure her communications and security. 2 0 It became evident that French
strategy had called for concessions in
the capital ship ratio argument to support their later demands for increased
auxiliary tonnage and to "introduce the
submarine controversy ... 2 1
In spite of the acknowledged importance of the submarine limitation question, both the United States and Great
Britain chose to defer discussion until
the capital ship ratios had been at least
tentatively agreed upon. In response to
a request by the Netherlands that she be
granted a large allotment of submarine
tonnage, Roosevelt recorded this interpretation of the submarine ratio situation. "My view of the matter," wrote
Roosevelt,
is that we should get our established ratio for the three major
naval powers and stick to it religiously. If we depart from it we will
immediately get into a vexed
situation [with] France ... Fun-
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damentally England's real fear of
France is based on submarine tonnage. If this were eliminated a
mutual agreement would quickly
be reached. [But if the Netherlands is allowed to build 45,000
tons] I could foresee trouble at
once. We are accordingly preparing a reply for the State Department in which we urge that
the matter be held in abeyance,
and that America stand as she has
stood, upon the ratio established
by the three great powers. 2 2
In addition, the General Board had
indicated that the submarine tonnage
proposed by the Secretary of State
expressed the "maximum reduction in
submarine armament to which the
United States [could] subscribe.,,2 3
It was common knowledge among
the conferees that Great Britain wished
to pursue her often stated goal of
submarine abolition. On 19 December
Secretary Hughes and Roosevelt discussed the British position. Both agreed
that it was a "foolish thing" but, from
their meetings with Lee and Balfour, it
was clear that the British were "set on
the matter." Lee had told Roosevelt
that the English did not feel that bringing the abolition question before the
Conference would embarrass their position because "at no time did they
expect [that] a decision in this matter,
contrary to what they consider correct,
would force them to leave the conference." The British were convinced
that they would eventually have the
submarine abolished by repeatedly hammering at it. 24
That the French, however, were not
prepared to outlaw the submarine was
made clear 2 days later (21 December)
when Roosevelt met with Admiral de
Bon of the French delegation. The
admiral informed Roosevelt that the
French did not wish to "cut down on
submarines" and asked for the "up-set
figure" of American submarine needs,
expressing his assumption that we

would want only about 60,000 tons. 25
Roosevelt was of the opinion that
France would want at least as much and
that to allow such an amount would be
"as good as not cutting down at all."
Nor would Britain "hear to 60,000 tons
for the French.,,2 6 His conversation
with de Bon only served to reinforce
what he had felt for several days. "We
will have to make our agreement on
callital ships ... and let the auxiliary
tonnage insofar as submarines [are concerned] ... go, pass by the board, with
certain restrictions.,,2 7
The first extended discussion of submarine limitation took place during the
fifth meeting of the Committee on
Limitation of Armament (22 December)
where Albert Sarraut of the French
delegation pointed out that further discussion of naval limitation "could not
be pursued without taking into account
the question of submarines.,,2 8 Lord
Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the
British Admiralty, noted that the question of submarines was of "transcendent
importance" to the British Empire, and
he regretted that this appeared to be the
only question on which his delegation
was out of sympathy with the American
proposals and the views of France and
the other powers. 29 Lee then presented
figures to illustrate his contention that
the American submarine proposals actually provided for an increase in the
submarine fleets of the major powers. 3 0
In a lengthy statement designed to
counter the prosubmarine arguments of
the other powers, Lee recounted the
wartime experience of the submarine
and noted that its real value was, and
would continue to be, its utility as a
commerce destroyer. The submarine,
Lee maintained, was essentially an offensive weapon involving murder and
piracy upon the seas. It was the only
class of vessel for which the Conference
was asked to give permission to thrive
and multiply, and it would be a great
disappointment to the British Empire if
they could not persuade the Conference
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to abolish this weapon. 3 1 Lee then
offered to scrap the entire British submarine fleet of 80,000 tons, which was
the "largest and probably the most
efficient submarine navy in the world,"
provided the other powers would do
likewise. 3 2 The sympathies of the other
nations were visibly prosubmarine, however, and Lee hardly expected to convince all the powers to come round to
the British point of view. With this in
mind the British delegate noted that
they had no intention of jeopardizing
the capital ship agreement if they failed
to carry the point regarding the submarine and would, therefore, welcome any
suggestions for the reduction and restriction of the submarine. 3 3
Following the presentation of the
English case for abolition, the French
representative Albert Sarraut presented
his country's views on the submarine.
His words reinforced the prosubmarine
attitude the French had supported for
many years. The submarine was an
excellent defensive weapon, contended
Sarraut, particularly for those nations
without a large fleet of battleships. It
was, therefore, an "excellent means of
preserving her independence ... especially in view of the sacrifices to which
she has been asked to consent in the
matter of capital ships.,,3 4 As for the
employment of the submarine in the
war, noted Sarraut, there is "reason for
condemning [the] belligerent, but not
for condemning the submarine." The
French spokesman concluded his remarks with the statement that
... The French Government cannot consent to accept either the
abolition of submarines, or a reduction of the total tonnage of
submarines which it considers to
be the irreducible minimum necessary to insure the safety of the
territories for which it is responsible, or a limitation of the individual tonnage of submarines. 3 5
In somewhat briefer statements, the
Italian and Japanese representatives

presented their official views of the
submarine question. Senator Schanzer,
speaking for Italy, supported the French
contention that the submarine was a
defensive weapon necessary to protect
the lines of communication upon which
Italy depended. The Italian delegation,
observed the Senator, thought that a
Conference involving only five of the
world's navies could not settle a question which concerned so many others.
In spite of its appreciation of the
humanitarian arguments of the British
delegation, concluded Schanzer, Italy
could not associate itself with the proposal for submarine abolition. 36
The Japanese deleg~te, Masanao
Hanihara, presented similar arguments
regarding the positive defensive capabilities of the submarine. As far as the
legitimacy of the weapon was concerned, Hanihara pointed out that "any
weapoIl might become illegitimate if
used without restriction.,,3 7 Furthermore, for an insular nation like Japan,
submarines were relatively inexpensive,
yet effective. Japan would favor, therefore, "more vigorous international rules
governing their proper use. ,,3 8
Hughes reinforced this position by
reading the report on submarines
adopted by the Advisory Committee of
the American delegation on 1 December.39 As a man-of-war, the submarine
has a "very vital part to play,,,40 and as
a scout, continued the report, "the
submarine has great possibilities ... it
has value, a legitimate use, and no
nation can decry its employment in this
fashion ...41 Again alluding to the Japanese threat in the Pacific, the report
declared that although the United States
would never undertake unlimited submarine warfare, delay tactics until major
fleet operations began could,
... at some future time result in
the United States holding its outlying possessions. If these colonies
once fall, the expenditure of men
necessary to recapture them will
be tremendous and may result in a
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drawnout war which would really
be a United States defeat. The
United States needs a large submarine force to protect its interests. 42
The United States had completely
reversed its position on submarine abolition from that taken 3 years earlier at
the Paris Peace Conference. England was
now without support in her campaign to
abolish the submarine.
At the next meeting of the committee (23 December) Admiral de Bon,
speaking for his country, indicated that
the Conference could not "reasonably
limit submarine tonnage," but if such a
limit were to be fixed, the American
proposal of 90,000 tons was "the absolute minimum for all navies who may
want to have a submarine force.,,43
Great Britain responded by accusing
France of favoring the submarine because of its ability to wage a successful
war against merchant fleets. 44 Balfour
then attempted to win Italy to the
abolitionist point of view by pointing
out that country's vulnerability to submarine operations in its dependence on
seaborne commerce. Italy, however, suggested that the best course to follow
would be to place restrictions on the
offensive operations of submarines
rather than abandon what they considered a defensive weapon. 4 5
The confrontation between Great
Britain and France over the question of
submarine abolition dominated the
seventh session (24 December) of the
committee also. Sarraut restated
France's position that "An agreement
had been reached on the reduction of
offensive naval armaments, but the
question of means of defense [i.e.,
submarines] must be left to the consideration of the countries interested.,,46 Balfour countered by asking,
"Against whom is this submarine fleet
being built? What purpose is it to serve?
What danger to France is it intended to
guard against?" These were questions,
noted Balfour, to which no satisfactory

answers had been given, and the implications were a definite threat to British
seapower. 47
Secretary Hughes terminated the debate on the abolition of the submarine
by saying that further discussion of the
matter was futile and that it was impossible to "expect a result favorable to
the adoption of ... a resolution to
abolish the submarine.,,48
With the abolition controversy
ended, the Committee on Limitation of
Armament turned its attention to the
problem of quantitative and qualitative
restrictions to be placed on submarines.
As England had rejected the original
American tonnage figure of 90,000 tons
as being too large, Secretary Hughes
now proposed that both Great Britain
and the United States accept 60,000
tons as their maximum submarine tonnage while France, Italy, and Japan
maintain their present tonnage as the
maximum. 49
This offer was readily accepted by
the British delegation at the next
meeting of the committee (also 24
December) but met with considerable
argument from the other powers. Admiral de Bon stated that a minimum of
90 submarines (90,000 tons) were required to safeguard French security. To
reduce their force below this limit, "was
equivalent to abolishing the whole
French program ... ,,50 The admiral informed the committee that the figures
were so far below what they had originally contemplated that the French
delegation must refer them to Paris for
study. Italy announced that she would
accept the new tonnage figures only on
the condition that they represent parity
with France. 51 The Japanese delegate
pointed out that their acceptance of the
original tonnage allowance of 54,000
tons called for a considerable sacrifice
and compromise on their part and was
the minimum tonnage acceptable to
them. 5 2 Japan was so remotely situated, concluded her spokesman, "thatit
must be evident to all that her subma-
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rines could not constitute a menace to
any nation.,,5 3 Secretary Hughes terminated the discussion on submarine
limitation at this juncture to await the
French reply to the new American
proposal.
On the following Tuesday (27 December) Admiral Pratt submitted to
Roosevelt a memorandum reviewing the
discussions in the Committee of Fifteen
since its formation by the Committee
on Limitation of Armament. Pratt
noted that "a certain amount of tension
had resulted owing to the uncompromising attitude of Great Britain and
France on the submarine question,,,5 4
and suggested that they put the submarine question "under the ice to cool"
and stop discussing it. 5 5 Also, in recommending that the question of other
auxiliary tonnage (cruisers, destroyers
et cetera) not be raised until the submarine question was settled, Pratt warned
that the United States should guard
against the setting of a precedent by
allowing Japan an out of ratio tonnage
in an attempt to yield to France, for
that country (France) might make a
similar claim at a later date. 5 6
Admiral Pratt was of the oplIDon
that the submarine problem adversely
affected aircraft carrier tonnage limitation which, in his mind, was second
only to capital ship tonnage. It was
important to settle this question first,
and whether or not a decision was later
reached in submarines, the purpose of
the Conference would have been fairly
accomplished. "The ratio is the Big
Thing of this conference," wrote Pratt.
"It is the power back of us which
assures the Anglo-Saxon peoples that
the rule of Constitutional government
and its ideals during years of peace or of
war shall be the law of land and of sea."
To emphasize his point regarding the
importance of the ratio, Pratt offered
his resignation if it was departed
from. 57
During the evening of the same day
(27 December), Hughes received a letter

from the ~rj.tish delegation (Balfour)
summarizing that country's position regarding the submarine. Balfour reiterated the British desire for total
abolition. If this was not possible, however, they would favor any diminution
in their number. But, noted Balfour,
"no mere diminution in their numbers
during peace would relieve us from the
necessity of devising and preparing all
practicable methods of dealing with
them in war, so that no limitation of
anti-submarine vessels would seem consistent with our national safety.,,58
Antisubmarine vessels could, of course,
include just about every type of vessel
except capital ships, aircraft carriers,
and fleet support ships.
That this was the only policy England had chosen to pursue was confirmed by the contents of a secret
dispatch from Churchill to Balfour sent
at the time of Balfour's initial pleas for
submarine abolition. This dispatch was
not made public until it was mentioned
by Churchill during a speech in the
House of Commons in 1930. 59
In this letter, Churchill lauded the
British delegation's decision to press for
total abolition of the submarine. "We
apprehend, however," continued
Churchill,
that there is very little chance of
the abolition of submarines being
agreed upon, and in this event we
must insist at all costs upon absolute freedom in regard to the
character and number of all vessels under, say, 10,000 tons. We
cannot, in the face of French
freedom to construct a great submarine fleet, to say nothing of the
submarine and cruiser concentration of other powers, enter into
any agreement fettering our
liberty to build whatever numbers
and classes of cruisers and antisubmarine warfare craft we may
consider necessary ....
Even at the cost of a complete
rupture, we feel certain that you
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will not agree to any restriction in
this sphere without previous consultation with the cabinet. 6 0
It is evident that the submarine was the
key to any meaningful limitation beyond the agreement already reached for
capital ships.
Formal discussion of submarine
limitation resumed 28 December with
the ninth gathering of the Committee
on Limitation of Armament. France
aggravated an already strained situation
by refusing to accept the status quo
offer (31,500 tons) for submarine tonnage made by Hughes at an earlier
meeting (24 December). Sarraut informed the committee that his government had concluded that
... it is impossible to accept a
limitation below 350,000 tons for
auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons
for submarines, without imperiling the vital interests of the
country and its colonies and the
safety of their naval life. The
French Delegation has been instructed to consent to no concession in regard to the above
figures. 61
Even though the French indicated
their acceptance of the capital ship
allowance assigned to them (175,000
tons) in the same announcement and
thereby kept the ratio intact, there was
little warmth in the remarks accorded
the French decision on the submarine.
Hughes was "disappointed" with the
French statement. If France had 90,000
tons of submarines, both the English
and Americans would have to greatly
increase their submarine fleets. This,
noted Hughes, could hardly be called
limitation or reduction62 and raised the
serious question whether anything
might be accomplished in regard to
submarines and auxiliaries.
Balfour was "profoundly disappointed" and pointed out that the
threefold increase in submarine tonnage
proposed by France would make her
equal to the major naval powers. This he

viewed as a "somewhat singular contribution to a Conference called for the
diminution of armament.,,63 Why, continued Balfour, did a fleet of capital
ships of 175,000 tons require 90,000
tons of submarines to scout for it and
protect it? It was perfectly obvious,
stated the English representative, "that
the proposed 90,000· tons of submarines
were intended to destroy commerce." It
should be perfectly clear, concluded
Balfour, that if the French were permitted to build 90,000 tons of submarines, "no limitation of any kind on
auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with
submarines could be admitted by the
government which he represented.,,64
The division in attitude toward the
submarine engendered by the French
refusal to accept limitation of their
submarine force and the British plan to
maintain freedom in constructing auxiliary craft rendered any agreement to
limit the tonnage of submarines at the
Conference impossible. Realizing this, at
a meeting of the Committee of Fifteen
on the same day, the various national
representatives "agreed to disagree" on
the submarine issue.
The Committee of Limitation of
Armament reconvened for its afternoon
session at 3:30, and following the discussion of a proposed limitation of
cruiser tonnage and maximum gun caliber for use aboard cruisers, Hughes
suggested that the committee consider
the action to be expressed by the
powers as regards the illegal use of
submarines. Elihu Root then presented
three resolutions designed to place certain restrictions upon the operations of
submarines through universal adherence
to international laws 65 regarding the
search, seizure, and destruction of merchant vessels in time of war; the prohibition of the use of submarines as
commerce destroyers; and the outlawing
of unrestricted submarine warfare. 66
The reading of the resolutions garnered
enthusiastic and warm replies from the
assembled representatives, but all the
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nations-except Great Britain-wished
to study them in detail and deferred
discussion until a later date. 6 7
At the next meeting of the committee (20 December) Admiral de Bon,
supported by the Italian and Japanese
representatives, recommended that the
resolutions be submitted to a group of
jurists for further study. Root, however,
declared that neither he nor the resolutions were "going to be buried -under a
committee of lawyers." "Either the
delegates assembled here," stated Root,
" ... must speak clearly and intelligently the voice of humanity which
had sent them here, and to which they
must report, or that voice would speak
for itself, and speaking without them,
would be their condemnation.,,6 8
Roosevelt described the debate over the
resolutions as "voluble and acrid" but
personally did not think the submarine
resolution (No.2) amounted to much.
It was, however, the "kind of a subject
which gives to diplomats an opportunity
for cantankerous disagreement.,,6 9
On 30 December the committee
opened discussion on the second Root
resolution relating to the elimination of
the submarine as a commerce destroyer.
This meeting was the setting for one of
the most heated exchanges between
Great Britain and France due, in part, to
a series of articles in Revue Maritime,
one of which was written by a Capitaine
de Fregate Castex and published in
January 1920. 70 The series, entitled
"Synthese de la Guerre Sous-Marine"
(Synthesis of the Submarine War), was
cited by Lord Lee to support the British
interpretation of French intentions, i.e.,
the submarines were not for defensive
purposes, as the French claimed, but for
offense and that the French favored a
submarine war on commerce as a legitimate weapon in time of war. The
Germans, wrote Castex, were absolutely
justified in resorting to unrestricted
submarine warfare and to neglect to do
so would have been to commit a great
blunder. The French writer concluded,

stated Lee, with the observation that
the instrument is finally at hand that
would "overthrow for good and all the
naval power of England. ,,71
Lee stated that he hoped these were
not the views of the French Government and that he expected immediate
repudiation. He also observed that there
was only one way that the French could
effectively disavow these statements and
that was by adopting the resolutions
proposed by the American delegation. It
was only through such action that they
could remove the British feelings of
apprehension and bitterness.
Admiral de Bon was the first to reply
for France. He stated that he was glad
to know the basis for the misunderstanding that had lasted so long between
the two countries. The Castex article,
asserted de Bon, "in no way represented ... the views of the French
Navy. This article, written by a man of
'letters,' was, in the eyes of the French
Delegation," a "monstrosity," and he
formally repudiated it in the name of
the French Navy. 72. Chairman Hughes
then put aside any further discussion of
the Root resolutions until the delegations had received advice from their
respective governments. 73
When the discussion of the Root
resolutions resumed on 5 January, so
did the battle OL semantics. The only
issue of real consequence arose when
Japan questioned the resolutions on the
use of submarines for blockading purposes. 74 Italy and Japan were both
opposed to Balfour's position that prohibition was the intent of the resolution. As the "conflict raged without
success," Roosevelt overheard a remark
passed from Sarraut to de Bon to the
effect that he would be glad to remain
silent and let Italy and Japan fight
France's battles. 75
Despite the protracted debate on the
Root resolutions, they were finally
approved and adopted during the 15th
and 16th meetings (5 and 6 January) of
the committee 76 and incorporated into
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a separate Treaty Regarding the Use of
Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare. 77 Following the meeting of 5
January, Roosevelt had strongly urged
Hughes to exclude them from the naval
treaty because " ... they deal with internationallaw and suggest amendments
to international law. [and] ... are not a
generic part of our treaty which is
composed of stipulations concerning
matters over which we have no control. 78
The submarine resolutions were laid
before the entire Conference during the
fifth plenary session (1 February) by
Elihu Root and subsequently approved.
Just prior to the reading of the treaty
incorporating the resolutions to the
assembled representatives, Root explained to Captain Rodgers, Chairman
of the General Board, that the resolutions were designed to "meet public
opinion with regard to [the] horrors
and lawlessness of the Germans. "
In his presentation before the Conference, Root pointed out that the
treaty "undertakes further to stigmatize
violations of these rules ... as violation
of the laws of war which, as between
these five great Powers and all other
civilized nations who shall give their
adherence thereto shall henceforth be
punished as an act of piracy.,,79 The
acceptance of the treaty closed the
subject of submarine limitation but was
ratified by only four of the powers
(France refused) and consequently
never became binding. With the defeat
of this treaty through lack of ratification, the only accomplishment of the
Washington Conference regarding the
limitation or restriction of submarines
was eliminated. The Conference adjourned on 6 February 1922 after the
adoption of 13 resolutions and seven
treaties.
A major ~ccomplishment of the
Washington Conference was the reo
placing of the Anglo·Japanese alliance
with a pledge between the United
States, Britain, Japan, and France to

respect each other's rights in their island
possessions in the Pacific (Four Power
Treaty, 13 December 1921). The nations represented at the Conference also
agreed to respect China's independence
and to uphold the principle of equal
industrial and commercial opportunity
in that country, thus formally accepting
America's Open Door policy in China
(Nine Power Treaty, 6 February 1922).
A third achievement was, of course,
naval limitations as outlined in the Five
Power Treaty also approved on 6 February 1922_ This agreement fixed the
status quo in fortifications in the Western Pacific, established a capital ship
construction holiday, made provisions
for the scrapping of certain battleships
and battle cruisers of the three major
naval powers, set tonnage limitations for
certain ship types (capital ships, aircraft
carriers), limited the maximum gun caliber for cruisers, and established the
naval strength ratio of 5:5:3:1.67:1.67
on aircraft carriers and capital ships.8 0
The major failure of the Washington
Conference was its inability to reach a
limitation agreement on the submarine,
the key to the limitation of the remaining classes of surface warships. For
the agreements at the Conference on
battleships and aircraft carriers to be
effective in reducing the chances of war,
it was necessary that these two types of
vessels be universally accepted as the
key factor of seapower. Furthermore,
limitation of these types only enhanced
the combatant value of the other unlimited vessels. Capt. Dudley W. Knox
observed that "It is very, very doubtful," whether this failure [to limit submarines] did not actually nullify the
effects of limitation on battle ships and
air-craft [sic] carriers .. _ ,,8 1
Any contribution the so-called submarine treaty might have made to the
limitation of armaments would have
been at best psychological, backed as it
was only by "world opinion," for it
made the submarine "an ordinary ship
of war and took from it the stigma of
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being a murderous and foul weapon. ,,82
As Admiral Sims wrote to Raymond L.
Buell, author of The Washington Conference, any nation menaced by defeat

and domination, "would use the submarine to save itself; ... the 'tremendous
power of public opinion' would not
prevent it being used ... ,,83
Another pessimistic evaluation of the
treaty came from a paper written several
days after the Conference ended by
Adm. William V. Pratt of the U.S. Navy.
The treaty, wrote Pratt, "is not practical
[and] will not work." Pratt likened the
submarine treaty to the Prohibition law,
for it was forcing something on the
majority of nations which they did not
or would not want in war. The treaty,
concluded the admiral, "is made to be
broken, and this in itself leads to a
disregard for the law .... ,,8 4
Admiral Sims concurred in this negative evaluation of the submarine treaty.
It would probably prove a failure, wrote
Sims, "because it is really impossible to
understand what it means.... It is
useless to talk about the rules of warfare
if the terms used are not accurately
defined. . . ,,85

The rather unrealistic attempt to
restrict the submarine by international
law enforced only by world public
opinion was hardly an adequate substitute for strict limitation by tonnage or
size of the individual submarine or of a
nation's submersible fleet. Lacking any
regulations upon construction of this
type of vessel, it was clear that those
nations which chose to do so were free
to engage in unlimited building programs not only in this category but in
the other unrestricted classes as well.
With competition underway anew, it
soon became apparent that further international attempts to limit naval armaments were necessary if the naval arms
race was to be halted.
The lessons from the attempts to
limit the submarine at Washington
should be abundantly clear. If a weapon
lends itself to the protection or advancement of a nation's interests,
meaningful limitation is doubtful.
Similarly, if political differences between nations cannot be settled, there
can be little genuine hope that important disarmament agreements can
be reached.
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